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Anastasia Kieliszek
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Abstract
I study the underlying decision factors of corporate business entity divestments. Specifically, I address four questions. Firstly,
what are decision factors concerning the business entity (divestment object) itself that influence divestment? I conclude
from previous research that negative entity performance, insufficient benefits from the interplay between entities (whether
between related or unrelated entities) and entity inferiority to marketplace alternatives (whether concerning costs or market
opportunities) each considerably increases business entity divestment likelihood. Secondly, what are the psychological factors
within decision-makers that influence divestment? I show from previous research that decision-makers’ familiarity with the
entity’s business segment may distort a decision-maker’s entity assessment, thus biasing divestment decisions; escalation of
commitment may lead to retaining failing projects despite being aware of their poor performance; and the managerial incentive
to conceal investment mistakes may at least postpone divestment as a result of self-interests.
Thirdly, what factors in the organizational context influence divestment? I find from previous research that negative firm
performance and path dependence of preceding divestments increase general propensity to divest, whereas units that are
perceived to be essential to organizational image and identity are more reluctantly exited.
Fourthly, which external stakeholders are important influencing factors in divestment? I indicate from previous research
that the media, political entities, and blockholders may pressure decision-makers significantly and sway divestment decisions.
Keywords: Corporate Divestment, Decision Factors, Psychological Factors, Organizational Factors, External Factors
1. Introduction
In March 2011, a tsunami hit Japan’s east coast, heav-
ily damaging the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Sta-
tion. The following meltdowns in reactors caused severe
nuclear contamination.1 Approximately three months later,
the German Bundestag committed to a nuclear power phase-
out.2 This radical energy turnaround in Germany was widely
deemed an unpredictable political change of mind and his-
toric event.3 Before 2011, Germany had accommodated ca.
25% of its energy demand with nuclear power and the cab-
inet under Chancellor Angela Merkel had distanced itself
from the nuclear phase-out previously politically pursued.4
The energy transition did not remain without far-reaching
effects for utilities. One of the firms that decided to make
extensive strategic changes was E.ON. E.ON’s spin-off of its
1Cf. Acton and Hibbs (2012).
2Cf. Deutscher Bundestag (2011).
3Cf. Dempsey (2011).
4Cf. World Nuclear Association (2016).
entire fossil fuel (including nuclear) business into a new
company, Uniper, was completed in 2016.5 Furthermore,
E.ON will fully divest its stake in Uniper until 2018.6 This
reflects E.ON’s new strategic orientation toward renewable
energy and customer orientation.7
The E.ON example illustrates how political changes can
result in considerable strategic shifts and divestments within
companies. The body of research on divestments has been
steadily growing over the past four decades, which suggests
a high and continuous pertinence in academia (cf. appendix
1). Furthermore, divestments have been relevant in business
practice for a long time and are typically strategically impor-
tant. Statistically, more than half of the businesses entered
between 1980 and 1982 had been divested again by their US
parent firms by 1986.8 Looking back further in time, it is
5Cf. Timperley (2016).
6Cf. Morison and Andresen (2015).
7Cf. E.ON SE (2015).
8Cf. Sharma and Kesner (1996), p. 651; Chang and Singh (1999), p.
1019.
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shown that about one third of the business lines acquired by
sizeable US companies during the 1950s and 1960s was no
longer in their business portfolios by 1975.9 Current estima-
tions for the new millennium predict that about one fifth of
acquisitions are later divested.10
But what specifically are divestments? Divestment
(sometimes also disinvestment or divestiture11) generally
can be defined as “a firm’s decision to dispose of a significant
portion of its assets”12. Alternative explanations include “the
process by which multi-establishment corporations shift or
relocate existing capital between their own establishments”13
and that divestments repeal the economic impact of invest-
ments.14
Taken together, it can be inferred from these characteri-
zations that divestments concern the voluntary15 release or
shift of capital previously tied up in major organizational
resources. For the purpose of this thesis, the focus will be
on divestments of business units16 (BUs), divisions17 or sub-
sidiaries18. ‘Business entities’ or ‘organizational units’ as di-
vestment objects (DOs) can stand for BUs, divisions, or sub-
sidiaries in this thesis. Consequently, decisions on distinct
assets alone (such as equity stakes in other companies or
machinery) as DOs will be excluded from the scope of this
thesis. This is because decisions on asset divestment tend
to be substantially more rationally methodized and ordered
than those concerning whole business entities, which tend
to be significantly more complex, less analytical and more
emotional.19 Divestment of organizational units can lead
to various kinds of losses accruing to the parent firm, such
as strategic, reputational, financial, or human resource and
identity related sacrifices.20 Thus, these two types of divest-
ment decisions can be expected to differ significantly in their
determinants and should be distinguished carefully. Further-
more, I do not require divested entities to have been formerly
9Cf. Weiss (1983), p. 440; Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987), p. 2.
10Cf. Shimizu (2007), p. 1502.
11Cf. Nees (1978), p. 68.
12Duhaime and Grant (1984), p. 301.
13Sheets et al. (1985), p. 219.
14Cf. Woehler (1981), p. 8.
15Cf. Nees (1978), p. 68.
16A BU spans the typical business functions, such as marketing, produc-
tion, finance, personnel, distribution, etc. (Cf. Mia and Clarke (1999): 142)
It has also been pointed out that a) a BU is a specific and distinguishable en-
tity that has authority to make strategic decisions on the BU-level, b) a BU’s
product line is distinct and independent of the ones of other firm BUs, and
c) a BU’s financial performance is evaluated by the firm to which it belongs.
(Cf. Martin and Eisenhardt (2010): 269)
17A division is located “within its parent company, selling a distinct set of
products or services to an identifiable group or groups of customers in com-
petition with a well-defined set of competitors.“ (Biggadike (1979): 104) A
BU can comprise several divisions under a common BU management. (Cf.
Kazmi (2002): 324)
18Whereas the definitions of BUs and divisions include functions and or
product lines, subsidiaries are primarily specified based on geography. Thus,
a subsidiary can be characterized as for instance “any operational unit con-
trolled by the multinational corporation and situated outside the home coun-
try.” (Birkinshaw (1997): 207)
19Cf. Duhaime and Schwenk (1985), p. 287; Zellweger and Astrachan
(2008), p. 357.
20Cf. Bergh (1997), p. 726.
acquired; hence, the DO can be acquired or organically de-
veloped. Another aspect of divestment apart from the object
to be decided on is the mode of exit from the DO in ques-
tion. There are different possibilities concerning how divest-
ments can be implemented, such as spin-offs (the equity in
the newly created independent entity is fully allocated to the
divesting firm’s shareholders), equity carve-outs (a fraction
of the equity in the newly founded firm is transferred to new
investors), management buy-outs (a firm’s existing managers
acquire a substantial equity stake in the newly formed entity),
sell-offs (another company fully purchases the DO), and ter-
mination.21
To explain why companies divest, it is frequently assumed
that poor financial DO performance is the dominant element
to drive the divestment decision.22 However, there is pro-
found evidence that a multitude of factors unrelated to DO
performance affect corporate divestment decisions signifi-
cantly.23 In fact, research has demonstrated that divestment
decisions typically are impacted by and the outcome of dif-
ferent interacting elements.24 But what are these general
factors that influence corporate divestment decisions?
The aim of this thesis is to provide a systematic and con-
cise examination of this question. The purpose is not to pro-
vide an exhaustive list of influencing factors, but to sum-
marize and categorize the main theoretical and empirical
findings in order to synthesize the different research sub-
streams and hopefully make a modest contribution for future
research.
Research subjects I explicitly exclude from the scope of
this thesis include divestment characteristics by industry25
or country26, decisions on the mode of exit27, success and
effects of divestments28, legal frameworks and their conse-
quences29, and privatization efforts30. Exemplary studies
concerning the specific research topics not analyzed in this
thesis can be found in the footnotes for further information.
Additionally, I follow several authors and omit organizations
whose primary business model is acquiring and selling busi-
nesses, as their divestment decisions tend to follow a differ-
ent, more systematic process and lack a general motivation
to retain business entities.31 A list of the 40 research articles
21Cf. Nees (1978), p. 68; Wright et al. (1994), p. 216; Damaraju et al.
(2015), p. 2.
22Cf. Duhaime and Grant (1984), p. 301.
23E.g. cf. Weston (1989), p. 68; Kaplan and Weisbach (1992), p. 108;
Ang et al. (2014), p. 58; Durand and Vergne (2015), p. 1205, Wan et al.
(2015), p. 205.
24Cf. Duhaime and Grant (1984), p. 311; Duhaime and Schwenk (1985),
p. 287.
25E.g. Ennew et al. (1992); Saha and Sensarma (2004); Cairns et al.
(2008).
26E.g. Beaty and Harari (1987); Chen and Wu (1996); Amankwah-Amoah
et al. (2013).
27E.g. Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999); Johnson et al. (2008);
Bergh and Sharp (2015).
28E.g. Afshar et al. (1992); Haynes et al. (2002); Depecik et al. (2014).
29E.g. Elzinga (1969); Baer and Redcay (2000); Dhooge (2006).
30E.g. Christensen (1998); Megginson and Scannapieco (2006); Khajar
(2014).
31Cf. Shimizu and Hitt (2005), p. 58; Bergh (1997), p. 721.
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most important for this thesis (out of 263 sources in total)
and an overview on the journals they were published in can
be found in the appendix 2 .
I clustered the factors that affect corporate divestment de-
cisions according to the entity in which the influence resides.
The structure of this thesis reflects these clusters and is or-
ganized as follows. I start from the narrow point of focus of
the DO characteristics that influence divestment probability
and more analytically shape divestment choices. I then move
to a broader focus, as I consequently consider individual psy-
chological factors inherent in decision makers that come into
effect and expectedly function on a less analytical level from
a firm perspective. Furthermore, organizational factors that
surround and influence divestment decisions and finally the
supra-organizational level of external forces are discussed.
As a conclusion, the main research findings will be summa-
rized and implications for business practitioners and future
research will be briefly deduced.
2. Divestment Object Factors
The scope of this section shifts from the BU in question,
to the entirety of the company’s BUs and to the options and
benchmark the marketplace provides concerning the specific
BU. Negative performance of the BU and possible DO itself
will be assessed first. Subsequently, insufficient benefits from
the interplay between different units of the same firm will be
considered. Finally, the conclusions from comparing a BU to
marketplace alternatives form the third divestment decision
aspect.
2.1. Negative Business Entity Performance
Ravenscraft and Scherer (1991) documented that for
their sample, high-profit business entities had a divestment
probability of 2%, whereas low-profit entities had around
30% divestment likelihood.32 A broad body of research has
soundly demonstrated an impact of BU performance on di-
vestment decisions. Performance has been computed for
instance as return on assets33, unit revenue growth, unit
competitive strength34, unit market share and unit perfor-
mance relative to other units within a firm.35 Negative busi-
ness entity performance was consistently found to be signif-
icantly associated with higher divestment probability across
32Cf. Ravenscraft and Scherer (1991), p. 434.
33Return on assets is a profitability indicator. It has been operationalized
using different formulas, according to a 2011 study the most common one is:
Return on assets = net income total assets. (cf. Jewell and Mankin (2011):
80-82)
34This evaluation was obtained by interviewing firm executives who as-
sessed their BUs and used an industry benchmark. (cf. Hamilton and Chow
(1993): 483)
35Cf. e.g. Duhaime and Grant (1984), p. 306; Ravenscraft and Scherer
(1991), p. 433; Hamilton and Chow (1993), p. 483; Bergh (1995), p. 228;
Chang (1996), p. 606; Zuckerman (2000), p. 603; Shimizu and Hitt (2005),
p. 59; Hayward and Shimizu (2006), p. 547; and Shimizu (2007), p. 1504.
these different operationalizations.36 Whereas many studies
found a general significant relationship37 and some studies
explicitly identified a linear38 association between the two
variables, Shimizu (2007) found a nonlinear relation, which
will be briefly described in the following.
When acquired business entities fail to meet the firm’s
performance goals, firms typically do not choose divestment
right away. Rather, firms tend to turn to relatively simple
mechanisms first, for instance stricter monitoring, in order
to increase the unit’s performance.39 When these attempts
fail, however, companies in many cases opt for more incisive
measures, such as divestment of the BU in question. Conse-
quently, the probability of divestment of a business, ceteris
paribus, is expected to increase if it performs weakly and its
outcomes decline persistently.40 Shimizu’s (2007) summa-
rized research results, however, show a nonlinear relation-
ship between poor unit performance and divestment proba-
bility:
Negative performance increases divestment likelihood,
but the effect tapers off as performance further deteriorates,
i.e. worse BU performance does not necessarily correspond
to higher chances of divestment.41 Consequently, several
moderating variables should be analyzed to assess how they
interact with the main effect described above.42 For the pur-
pose of this thesis, I will limit the discussion to unit size.43
The relationship between BU performance and divest-
ment expectedly is more pronounced if the unit’s size is large
relative to the firm as a whole.44 In this case, an entity’s lack
of success can be of substantial significance to the viability
of the organization as a whole.45 However, there also are
forces that might limit the accelerating effect of large BU size
in face of weak performance. Sizeable entities may be more
deeply connected to the organization by psychological and
commercial ties, which might decrease divestment probabil-
ity.46 Furthermore, the size of the BU itself may be a factor to
impede divestment efforts because of a lack of interested buy-
36Cf. Duhaime and Grant (1984), p. 311; Ravenscraft and Scherer
(1991), p. 434; Hamilton and Chow (1993), p. 481 et seq.; Bergh (1995),
p. 237; Chang (1996), p. 606; Cho and Cohen (1997), p. 371; Zuckerman
(2000), p. 610; Shimizu and Hitt (2005), p. 60; Hayward and Shimizu
(2006), p. 549; Shimizu (2007), p. 1508.
37E.g. cf. Duhaime and Grant (1984), p. 311; Hamilton and Chow
(1993), p. 481 et seq.; Ravenscraft and Scherer (1991), p. 434; Chang
(1996), p. 606; Cho and Cohen (1997), p. 371; Zuckerman (2000), p. 610;
Hayward and Shimizu (2006), p. 549.
38E.g. cf. Shimizu and Hitt (2005), p. 60.
39Cf. Porter (1976), p. 27; Hitt et al. (2001), p. 99 et seq.; Shimizu
(2007), p. 1500.
40Cf. Shimizu (2007), p. 1500.
41Cf. Shimizu (2007), p. 1507.
42Cf. Ibid., p. 1508.
43Other moderating variables that have been measured include resource
availability, potential slack on divestiment, ambiguity, firm performance,
firm age and size, board of directors turnover, divestment experience, and
mental accounting. (cf. e.g. Shimizu, 2007: p. 1507 et seq.; Shimizu &
Hitt, 2005: 53 et seq.; Hayward and Shimizu (2006): 555)
44Cf. Shimizu (2007), p. 1501.
45Cf. Shimizu and Hitt (2005), p. 54.
46Cf. Duhaime and Baird (1987), p. 484-486.
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ers.47 Additionally, the size of an entity might intensify a pos-
sible escalation of commitment (cf. 3.3, p. 13).48 Therefore,
BU size supposedly has a multi-faceted and complex mod-
erating impact with regard to the relationship between BU
performance and the divestment decision.49 In other words,
because entity performance affects divestment decisions in
conjunction with other interconnected factors, some of which
will be elaborated on in the following sections, worse unit
performance does not necessarily lead to continuously higher
divestment likelihood. In summary, entity performance and
divestment probability are related significantly, but moderat-
ing effects should be taken into account when trying to inter-
pret the particular statistical shape of the association.
Some studies have explicitly found negative entity perfor-
mance to have the highest explanatory power for divestment
decisions in their studies.50 Additionally, Harrigan (1981)
showed that for her set of data, the incurrence of losses in-
creases divestment probability for a declining business unit
by around 35%.51 However, in a study conducted with an
underlying sample of firms in the 1970s and 1980s, other
authors found that more than half of divested business enti-
ties reported a gain or no loss before divestment.52 Hence,
this could constitute further evidence that other considera-
tions may play a significant role in corporate divestment de-
cisions.53
2.2. Insufficient Benefits from the Interplay between Busi-
ness Entities
An additional dimension for the assessment of possible
DOs may be the relationship among the firm’s different orga-
nizational entities. When decision makers (DMs) hold that
the firm does not amply benefit from a BU’s interrelations
with other units, divestment probability for the specific unit
could be increased. In the following, I will discuss two dis-
tinct ways a company may benefit from integrating different
businesses into a whole: firstly, similar and related, and
secondly, dissimilar and unrelated firm units. Relatedness
could be operationalized as the existence of technological,
resource-related or product market relationships between
units.54 The common theme here is that if the either way
hoped-for advantages are not sufficiently attained for the DO
in question, divestment will be more likely.
Empirically, diversifying acquisitions are found to be al-
most four times more probable to be divested by their par-
47Cf. Bing (1978), p. 110 et seq.; Dundas and Richardson (1982), p. 293;
(Duhaime and Baird (1987), p. 486-487.
48Cf. Staw (1997), p. 204-205; Shimizu and Hitt (2005), p. 54; Shimizu
(2007), p. 1501.
49Cf. Duhaime and Baird (1987), p. 484 et seq.; Shimizu and Hitt (2005),
p. 54; Shimizu (2007), p. 1509.
50E.g. cf. Ravenscraft and Scherer (1991), p. 429, Hamilton and Chow
(1993), p. 481, Weisbach (1995), p. 177.
51Cf. Harrigan (1981), p. 314.
52Cf. Kaplan and Weisbach (1992), p. 108.
53Cf. Ibid., p. 136.
54Cf. Singh and Montgomery (1987), p. 379; Chang and Singh (1999),
p. 1019.
ent firms than related acquisitions, given very similar per-
formance levels.55 A study interviewing CEOs determined
that a high degree of diversification within their firms con-
stituted a highly important decision factor to divest certain
BUs.56 These facts may point to problems arising in firms
in which business units are not sufficiently connected strate-
gically, with the possible result of divestment.57 The main
benefits from related organizational units are a result of syn-
ergies that are attained by the conjunction of complemen-
tary or supplementary resources.58 Synergy can be defined as
“super-additivity in valuation of business combinations”59 or
as “the ability of two or more units [. . . ] to generate greater
value working together relative to what their value would
be separately”60. Porter (1976) and Harrigan (1981) argued
that specific exit barriers could deter firms from withdrawing
from a business despite poor financial performance.61 Ac-
cordingly, they predict higher divestment probability in the
absence of these barriers, one of which are synergies and
shared resources between related businesses.62 Synergistic
benefits can take different quantifiable forms. Unit interde-
pendency between the DO and the other entities has been
measured e.g. as transfer of technology to other units, a
common knowledge base (proxied through human resource
profile similarities), share of common plant and equipment,
proportion of sales to customers of the firm’s other entities
and fraction of inter-firm sales and purchases.63
Divested entities are empirically associated significantly
with lower proportions of these figures, i.e. with weak inter-
relations to other units.64
In some cases, however, a certain degree of unrelatedness
between the different BUs may be an explicit goal. Hoped-
for benefits then do not result from similarities between or-
ganizational entities, but rather the lack thereof. In this
regard, Bergh (1997) predicted that unrelated units would
more likely be divested if four main goals pursued with their
former acquisitions are not sufficiently met.65 Firstly, one
motivation for diversifying acquisitions of businesses could
be financial synergy.66 This aims at lowering the firm’s cost of
capital through less costly internal funding (and the potential
for cross-subsidization) or more attractive external financing
55Cf. Kaplan and Weisbach (1992), p. 107.
56Cf. Hamilton and Chow (1993), p. 483. A high degree of diversifica-
tion within the firm was ranked second in importance within the category
of organizational considerations and around fifth in the overall ranking of
decision factors.
57Cf. Ravenscraft and Scherer (1991), p. 430.
58Cf. Singh and Montgomery (1987), p. 384.
59Davis and Thomas (1993), p. 1334.
60Goold and Campbell (1998), p. 133.
61Cf. Porter (1976), p. 21; Harrigan (1981), p. 306.
62Cf. Porter (1976), p. 23; Harrigan (1981), p. 308.
63Cf. Porter (1976), p. 31; Harrigan (1981), p. 312; Duhaime and Grant
(1984), p. 307; Chang (1996), p. 595.
64Cf. Porter (1976), p. 31; Harrigan (1981), p. 314; Duhaime and Grant
(1984), p. 311; Chang (1996), p.605; Zuckerman (2000), p. 603.
65Cf. Bergh (1997), p. 717.
66Cf. Chatterjee (1986), p. 119; Trautwein (1990), p. 284; Walter and
Barney (1990), p. 80; Sudarsanam et al. (1996), p. 675; Bergh (1997), p.
716.
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conditions, secured by stronger credit worthiness due to e.g.
increased cash flow.67 Secondly, governance efficiency bene-
fits could be expected, if the acquired unit can be managed
more efficiently by the parent firm’s internal hierarchical sys-
tems than by the external market.68 The firm may allocate
financial resources more efficiently between business entities
to their highest valued use and control their efficiency more
potently than the stock market could if each entity were a
separate company.69 Thirdly, unrelated acquisitions could
be carried out because DMs aim to serve their managerial
self-interests.70 One reason here could be to increase their
compensation base, such as firm revenues.71 Finally, coinsur-
ance could be sought to counterbalance negatively correlated
earnings cycles and reduce firm risk.72 Bergh (1997) pro-
vided empirical evidence that a business entity is more likely
to be divested, ceteris paribus, if one or more of the above
mentioned unrelated acquisition objectives are not satisfac-
torily achieved.73
Therefore, a lack of benefits from the interplay of the or-
ganizational unit in question with the other units, whether
between related or unrelated businesses, can be expected to
increase divestment probability.
2.3. Inferiority to Marketplace Alternatives
In the previous section, divestment decisions have been
viewed more as an ad-hoc reaction to business entities which
are poorly performing or lack benefits from the interplay with
other entities. However, a firm might also take the initiative
and progressively seek superior opportunities in the market-
place in the course of its broad strategy for international com-
petitiveness.74 This research subject has not yet been widely
analyzed in divestment literature.75 It has been shown that,
should lower-cost production (i.e. efficiency opportunities)
or new market opportunities (i.e. market expansion opportu-
nities) in foreign markets exist, a firm might decide to at least
partly divest its current operations in order to bring organiza-
tional resources to their best use.76 Therefore, a BU might be
divested because it entails higher production costs or offers
limited market opportunity compared to other options.
Firstly, I will discuss lower-cost production opportunities.
In a survey, companies have expressed their intentions to
offshore77 23% and shift production between low-cost loca-
67Cf. Duhaime and Grant (1984), p. 302; Singh and Montgomery (1987),
p. 380; Trautwein (1990), p. 284; Bergh (1997), p. 717.
68Cf. Teece (1982), p. 52; Jones and Hill (1988), p. 160; Bergh (1997),
p. 716.
69Cf. Hill et al. (1992), p. 503.
70Cf. Ellert (1976), p. 729; Amihud and Lev (1981), p. 605; Seth (1990),
p. 100; Bergh (1997), p. 719.
71Cf. Tosi and Gomez-Mejia (1989), p. 169; Seth (1990), p. 100.
72Cf. Levy and Sarnat (1970), p. 795; Michel and Shaked (1984), p. 18;
Amit and Livnat (1988), p. 156; Lubatkin and Chatterjee (1994), p. 109.
73Cf. Bergh (1997), p. 726.
74Cf. Berry (2010), p. 380.
75Cf. Ibid., p. 381.
76Cf. Berry (2010), p. 380, 381.
77Offshoring, on the one hand, can be defined as shifting production from
tions for 24% of their capacity between 2012 and 2014.78
Because markets abroad can provide access to lower-priced
input factors, such as labor or raw materials, and thus po-
tential efficiency gains, a firm might decide to reconfigure
and relocate its production operations.79 Even so, this type
of investment would only influence divestment decisions, if
these new operations replace others that are subsequently di-
vested. Research has indicated that foreign production often
at least partly substitutes and not necessarily complements
home country production.80 These findings are also consis-
tent with Vernon (1966) prediction that production of mature
products will be shifted to countries with cheaper input fac-
tors.81 However, there have been mixed results concerning
whether certain organizational units are divested subsequent
to efficiency seeking investment in new units abroad across
different geographies and product lines.82 One explanation
could be to distinguish between high and low research & de-
velopment (R&D) intensive industries as a proxy for techni-
cal know-how and complexity.83 The hypothesis that invest-
ments in lower-cost production subsidiaries in foreign mar-
kets significantly increase domestic divestment probability is
empirically supported only for industries with low R&D in-
tensity (such as textiles or paper products).84
Less complex products typically can frequently be fully
produced more efficiently abroad, which may at least partly
render domestic production units obsolete.85
Secondly, new market opportunities will be discussed.
Promising new product and geographic market opportunities
by themselves do not necessarily lead to divestment of cur-
rent BUs and subsidiaries. In case one, new demand could be
served by increased production and investment in new opera-
tions without substituting business entities.86 Several studies
have indicated that market-seeking foreign investment may
augment a firm’s current activities, although results some-
times vary across geographies and other dimensions, such as
product categories.87 In addition, internationalization the-
ory predicts that foreign market opportunities enable com-
panies to utilize their existing proprietary assets on a wider
scale.88 Thus, this perspective also predicts that demand op-
portunities will not increase divestment probability of current
BUs. However, in case two, market seeking investments can
domestic to foreign sources, whether or not this coincides with outsourcing
the activity. On the other hand, outsourcing means purchasing from an ex-
ternal supplier instead of producing internally, regardless of the production
location. (Cf. Abramovsky and Griffith (2006): 595)
78Cf. The Economist (2013).
79Cf. Berry (2010), p. 381.
80Cf. Blonigen (2001), p. 99; Head and Ries (2001), p. 108.
81Cf. Vernon (1966), p. 196 et seq.
82Cf. Lipsey et al. (2000), p. 296; Blonigen (2001), p. 100 et seq.; Head
and Ries (2001), p. 108.
83Cf. Berry (2010), p. 385.
84Cf. Ibid., p. 392.
85Cf. Ibid., p. 392, 393.
86Cf. Ibid., p. 382.
87Cf. Lipsey and Weiss (1984), p. 304; Blomström et al. (1997), p. 1795;
Clausing (2000), p. 203.
88Cf. Dunning (1980), p. 9; Berry (2010), p. 382.
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substitute current business entities. It has been argued that
resource and capability constraints and opportunity costs89
may induce managers to reallocate resources to their opti-
mal use.90 This indicates that new market opportunities in-
crease divestment likelihood of present organizational enti-
ties, as there are limitations to possible and profitable geo-
graphic and product diversification.91 Therefore, contingen-
cies that determine whether or not the pursuit of new market
opportunities abroad will replace operations should be ana-
lyzed. In this regard, it has been pointed out that compa-
nies with an already broad product portfolio and multigeo-
graphic presence are more likely to face trade-offs and the
need to allocate their constrained resources to their best use
when intending to pursue new growth opportunities.92 The
prediction that product-diversified firms with high levels of
foreign expansion are likely to divest domestic subsidiaries
after they invest in foreign subsidiaries to leverage market op-
portunities is empirically supported.93 Divestment likelihood
is not affected, however, in firms with a low level of multi-
geographic presence. This is consistent with the notion that
firms become increasingly impacted by resource constraints
when they diversify their product lines and geographies (and
thus increase their business complexity) and may face the
need to reduce redundancies.94 Overall, these results sug-
gest that new market opportunities may complement or sub-
stitute existing business activities, depending on the specific
firm characteristics.
Therefore, more efficient production or promising mar-
ket opportunities can be superior alternatives compared to
current organizational units. In this regard, the opportunity
costs of not pursuing a preferable alternative or costly redun-
dancy of not divesting inferior or unnecessary business enti-
ties can be seen as increasing divestment probability under
certain circumstances.
To summarize this section, each of the factors negative
business entity performance, a lack of benefits from the in-
terplay of organizational units and superior marketplace al-
ternatives can significantly increase the probability of a BU to
be divested by its parent firm. The motivation to divest when
faced with financial failure of a DO or lack of benefits from
the interplay between the DO and other business entities can
be seen as more reactive and dealing with difficulties, in con-
trast to the more proactive opportunity seeking that lies in
the consideration of marketplace alternatives.95
89“The opportunity cost of making a particular decision has been defined
as the value of the best alternative course of action which must be foregone
as a result of making the decision.” (Carrington and Battersby (1967): 299)
90Cf. Levinthal and Wu (2010), p. 793 and 794; Berry (2010), p. 383.
91Cf. Berry (2010), p. 383.
92Cf. Ibid., p. 383.
93Cf. Berry (2010), p. 392.
94Cf. Ibid., p. 392.
95Cf. Duhaime and Baird (1987), p. 485; Berry (2010), p. 380.
3. Individual Psychological Factors
From a firm perspective, the three DO factors discussed
in section two could be seen as more analytical considera-
tions underlying the divestment decision. However, research
has pointed out that other influencing factors might impair
firms’ attempts to act as systematically and foresightedly as
they may perceive to do.96 As will be shown in this section,
there could be individual psychological factors that prevent
the firm from divesting organizational units, at least in a
timely manner. Divestment decisions typically are a highly
confidential and delicate topic within companies.97 Not only
are divestment decisions widely a symbol for failure, but
are also of unstructured, ambiguous and complex nature.98
Therefore, perceptional processes and psychological factors
typically shape decision-making.99 Although several organi-
zational levels can be involved, the top management team
(TMT), including the chief executive officer (CEO), plays a
central role in deciding whether or not to continue a certain
business.100 Independent of a DM’s specific position within
the firm, general psychological factors and personal motiva-
tions might shape his or her considerations, thoughts, and
reasoning. In the following, the aspects of the DM’s famil-
iarity with a DO’s business segment, escalation of commit-
ment, and the drive to conceal investment mistakes will be
discussed.
3.1. Familiarity with the Divestment Object’s Business Seg-
ment
There is ample evidence that managers and investors gen-
erally unintentionally favor the familiar.101 Research has in-
dicated that similarity induces greater liking (similarity at-
traction bias), which in turn potentially distorts individual
perception, possibly leading to too favorable assessment be-
cause of attribution biases.102 In a recent study, Ang et al.
(2014) empirically assessed whether CEO familiarity with
business segments (which may consist of several BUs) affects
divestment decisions. Thus, they inquire into DMs’ social dis-
tance to DOs, measured as CEOs’ personal ties to business
segments.103
Firstly, their comparative information hypothesis predicts
that CEOs tend to divest business entities from segments fa-
miliar to them at a significantly lower probability.104 A CEO
96Cf. Duhaime and Grant (1984), p. 303.
97Cf. Nees (1981), p. 119; Duhaime and Grant (1984), p. 308.
98Cf. Nees (1978), p. 68; Duhaime and Grant (1984), p. 308; Duhaime
and Schwenk (1985), p. 287.
99Cf. Duhaime and Schwenk (1985), p. 288.
100Cf. Nees (1978), p. 68; Nees (1981), p. 119; Duhaime and Schwenk
(1985), p. 290; Shimizu and Hitt (2005), p. 54; Wan et al. (2015), p. 211.
101Cf. e.g. Feldstein and Horioka (1980), p. 328; French and Poterba
(1991), p. 222; Coval and Moskowitz (1999), p. 2045; Lewis (1999), p.
604; Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), p. 1053; Huberman (2001), p. 659;
Li (2004), p. 47; Parwada (2008), p. 245.
102Cf. Dustin and Alfonsin (1971), p. 119; Karylowski (1976), p. 71;
Brown (1984), p. 21; Strauss et al. (2001), p. 637; Bates (2002), p. 540;
Cialdini and Goldstein (2002), p. 40; Amodio and Showers (2005), p. 818;
Westphal and Deephouse (2011), p. 1063.
103Cf. Ang et al. (2014), p. 58, 60.
104Cf. Ibid., p. 59, 61.
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is said to be familiar with a specific firm BU if he or she pre-
viously worked there or in another firm BU that operates in
the same industry.105 It is argued that a CEO’s career path
within a segment grants him or her an information advan-
tage for familiar business fields. Executives are presumed
to favor managing familiar segments, as their previous work
experience provides them with a more thorough understand-
ing of a segment’s business, which in turn strengthens their
confidence in evaluating the quality of investment opportuni-
ties.106 Consistent with this line of thought, Heath and Tver-
sky (1991) state that “people prefer [. . . ] a context where
they consider themselves knowledgeable or competent than
a context where they feel ignorant or uninformed”107. Ad-
ditionally, BU managers typically have an incentive to por-
tray their BUs in a too positive light to avoid divestment and
gain greater access to resources. Therefore, CEOs broadly
discount BU managers’ disclosed private information about
BUs’ future cash flows, which CEOs often have to rely on
to assess BUs (information asymmetry108).109 For segments
with which the CEO is familiar, however, the conveyed infor-
mation expectedly will be discounted less. This is because
information sharing is facilitated through a higher level of
trust and more extensive personal interaction when the CEO
and the BU manager share a common background and have
informal links.110 Thus, CEOs expectedly will prefer divest-
ing from unfamiliar business segments for the full length of
their tenure.111
Nevertheless, should the CEO not be able to carry out his
or her preferred divestment choice, familiarity will not have a
significant impact on resulting divestments. As Coase (1937)
put it, a firm is a “system of relationships”112. Thus, Ang
et al. (2014) predict, following their political power hypoth-
esis, that CEOs’ inclination to divest non-familiar segments is
contingent on CEOs commanding the political power to im-
plement their favored choices.113 BU managers have bargain-
ing power in the divestment decision process due to valuable
private information and internal political clout.114 Newly
appointed CEOs are most susceptible to managers’ bargain-
ing power because they have not yet built up ample political
power themselves.115 Thus, CEOs try to accumulate political
105Cf. Ibid., p. 59.
106Cf. Ibid., p. 59.
107Heath and Tversky (1991), p. 7.
108Information asymmetry characterizes a situation in which a set of actors
(here the BU managers) is systematically better informed about something
(here the BU’s performance and business prospects) than another set of ac-
tors (here the TMT). (Cf. Akerlof (1970): 489-490; Eisenhardt (1989): 61)
109Cf. Harris et al. (1982), p. 604; Antle and Eppen (1985), p. 164; Harris
and Raviv (1996), p. 1140; Harris and Raviv (1998), p. 260; Bernardo et al.
(2001), p. 312; Ang et al. (2014), p. 59.
110Cf. Zucker (1986), p. 53; Mayer et al. (1995), p. 710; Gaspar and Massa
(2011), p. 841; Duchin and Sosyura (2013), p. 387; Ang et al. (2014), p.
59.
111Cf. Ang et al. (2014), p. 59.
112Coase (1937), p. 393.
113Cf. Ang et al. (2014), p. 59.
114Cf. Stein (2003), p. 111; Mudambi and Navarra (2004), p. 385; Glaser
et al. (2013), p. 1577.
115Cf. Xuan (2009), p. 4921; Ang et al. (2014), p. 59.
capital by creating goodwill and support among managers of
unfamiliar business segments who were not previously affil-
iated with the CEO.116 As a result, CEOs expectedly refrain
from divesting entities from unfamiliar business segments to
gain political capital with the managers of these segments,
until they have built up enough political clout to follow their
divestment preferences.117
Empirical findings support both hypotheses. Indeed, in
line with the first hypothesis, units from segments familiar to
the CEO are divested around 40% less often than those from
non-familiar segments. This favoring of familiar segments
within the firm (familiarity effect) is more pronounced in
units in which the CEO had previously been employed com-
pared to units for which the CEO has more indirect experi-
ence from working in another firm unit operating in the same
industry.118 Nevertheless, both degrees of familiarity are sig-
nificantly associated with lower divestment risk compared to
unfamiliar segments. Additionally, the impact of familiarity
is found to be strongest in business segments with high R&D
intensity. This supposedly is because information asymme-
try between CEOs and unit managers is most severe in these
complex businesses, information is typically difficult to trans-
mit without personal contact and the assessment of these
businesses is particularly complicated.119 Consistent with
the second hypothesis, increased probability of divestment
for non-familiar segment units is predominantly observed in
the subsample of CEOs with tenure of three years or more,
whereas less powerful new CEOs are found to act contrary
to their preferences in divesting BUs from familiar segments
more often.120 This evidence is also concordant with Xuan’s
(2009) conclusion that new, particularly outside, CEOs, re-
frain from exiting non- familiar segments at the beginning
of their tenure and Huang’s (2010) finding that established
CEOs tend to divest BUs which do not reflect the CEO’s skill
set and experience.121 Therefore, divestment probability is
increased if the CEO is not familiar with the business entity
in question and has sufficient political power to act according
to his preferences.
3.2. Escalation of Commitment
It is a fact that many business entities deteriorate in per-
formance persistently before being divested.122 For instance,
data from Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) suggests that di-
vested units have experienced below industry profit rates for
about seven years before being divested.123 This can be seen
as evidence that personal attachments to entities may im-
pact decision-making, preventing more timely divestment.124
116Cf. Xuan (2009), p. 4921; Ang et al. (2014), p. 59.
117Cf. Ang et al. (2014), p. 59.
118Cf. Ibid., p. 59.
119Cf. Ang et al. (2014), p. 59.
120Cf. Ibid., p. 59.
121Cf. Xuan (2009), p. 4945, Huang (2014), p. 348.
122Cf. Duhaime and Grant (1984), p. 303.
123Cf. Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987), p. 167.
124Cf. Duhaime and Grant (1984), p. 303; Cho and Cohen (1997), p. 368.
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Porter (1976) and Harrigan (1981) argue that managerial
exit barriers exist, which deter economically rational BU di-
vestment and lead to suboptimal results for the company, and
that DMs might be reluctant to sacrifice firm assets.125 It has
been pointed out that DMs might hesitate to divest organi-
zational units because they personally identify with and feel
attached to a business and its employees, especially if the
business has been part of the organization for a long time
and is considered a firm’s ‘home industry’. Thus, DMs may
experience psychological aversion to divest.126
Consistent with this notion, Staw coined the term escala-
tion of commitment (EOC) to describe the irrational tendency
to hang on to a failing course of action and persistently com-
mit further and increasing resources and effort to it instead
of withdrawing, despite evidence of poor and declining per-
formance.127 There have been numerous studies that found
evidence for an EOC effect in different settings.128 It has been
argued that the complex, unstructured, and ambiguous na-
ture of divestment decisions make DMs susceptible to cogni-
tive biases129, such as EOC, as available information exceeds
processing capacity.130 DMs’ feeling of personal responsibil-
ity and attachment seemingly prompts them to remain with
their projects despite poor performance.131 Apparently, DMs
are not alerted to change their course of action by the dis-
crepancy between expected and evidenced performance, but
rather seem to use evidence of failure as a signal to commit
further capital to make the action pay off.132
Individuals may be driven not only to seek future utility
but also to rectify past losses. This sunk cost fallacy means
that sunk losses (effort, money, time, etc.) incurred in the
past do often enter decision calculations and induce DMs to
invest further in a losing account, although rational individu-
als should only allocate resources when future expected ben-
efits exceed future expected costs.133 Several behavioral cau-
sations for EOC have been put forward that help understand
the phenomenon and how it may be mitigated more soundly.
Five brief explanations can be found in the appendix 4 for
further information.
Extreme forms of cognitive biases, such as EOC, induce
DMs to consider too few alternatives and data, prompt ir-
rational behavior, and reduce the likelihood that reasonable
divestments will be timely.134 Hence, DMs should try to min-
125Cf. Porter (1976), p. 23; Harrigan (1981), p. 308.
126Cf. Porter (1976), p. 25 et seq.
127Cf. Staw (1981), p. 577; Arkes and Blumer (1985), p. 124; Duhaime
and Schwenk (1985), p. 290; Brockner (1992), p. 39; Damarju, Barney &
Makhija (2015), p. 729.
128Cf. e.g. Staw (1976), p. 27; Arkes and Blumer (1985), p. 124; Brockner
et al. (1986), p. 109; Garland (1990), p. 728; McCarthy et al. (1993), p.
10; Wong and Kwong (2007), p. 545.
129Biases are “systematic errors [...], and they recur predictably in particu-
lar circumstances.“ (Kahneman (2011): 3-4)
130Cf. Duhaime and Schwenk (1985), 287, 288.
131Cf. Ibid., p. 290.
132Cf. Ibid., p. 290.
133Cf. Staw (1981), p. 578; Arkes and Blumer (1985) p. 124; Kanodia
et al. (1989), p. 60; van Putten et al. (2010), p. 33; Kahneman (2011), p.
345; Hafenbrack et al. (2014), p.2.
134Cf. Duhaime and Schwenk (1985), p. 293; Damarju, Barney & Makhija
imize being involuntarily influenced by EOC in order to be
able to make analytical decisions in the best interest of the or-
ganization. Research has suggested several factors that may
intensify or weaken EOC. In the following, I will concisely dis-
cuss six aspects that influence EOC intensity from a firm per-
spective: whether BUs are internally developed or acquired,
TMT turnover, and four facets relating to the DM in question,
which are awareness of cognitive biases, perceived competi-
tion, active or passive consideration of divestment, and atten-
tion to opportunity costs. The notion of EOC is in line with
evidence indicating that formerly acquired units are more
likely to be divested, ceteris paribus, than organically devel-
oped ones.135 One explanation could be that EOC tendencies
operate to a lesser extent here, as DMs may be less attached
to an externally acquired unit in contrast to an internally de-
veloped and grown unit.136 However, even with acquired
units, after lengthy and complex evaluation and negotiation
processes with potential acquisition targets, managers may
be highly committed to the units that are eventually taken
over.137 Therefore, EOC may expectedly be weaker but still
existent for externally acquired units. Also, TMT turnover is
shown to increase general divestment probability.138 A new
CEO or new board member generally, when not promoted
from the internal hierarchy, provides an opportunity to assess
business entities from a fresh perspective.139 Furthermore, a
new top manager hired from outside the firm typically is less
attached to existing business entities, and thus less prone to
EOC, because the new DM was not responsible for past busi-
ness decisions.140 Therefore, TMT turnover might be a way
for a firm to decrease EOC influence on divestment decisions.
Additionally, there also are factors that may help the spe-
cific executive in charge to restrain his or her EOC. Firstly,
scholars have generally advised awareness and understand-
ing of possible mental pitfalls and developing a clear lan-
guage to address them in order to be better able to iden-
tify and mitigate one’s cognitive biases.141 This may help
DMs be sensitive to possible errors in their judgment, such
as EOC, and thus limit their influence. Secondly, psycholog-
ical experiments have demonstrated that EOC effects were
higher when subjects believed that they were in competi-
tion with other people.142 Scholars have argued that this
due to the desire to save face and be perceived as strong
and competent by others.143 Consequently, DMs may try to
(2015), p. 729.
135Cf. Porter (1976), p. 27; Hoskisson and Turk (1990), p. 469; Raven-
scraft and Scherer (1991), p. 436; Chang and Singh (1999), p. 1033; Karim
(2009), p. 1247.
136Cf. Porter (1976), p. 27.
137Cf. Duhaime and Schwenk (1985), p. 290.
138Cf. Porter (1976), p. 26; Duhaime and Grant (1984), p. 303; Raven-
scraft and Scherer (1991), p. 429; Weisbach (1995), p. 176; Shimizu and
Hitt (2005), p. 63; Hayward and Shimizu (2006), p. 549; Feldman (2014),
p. 824.
139Cf. Bigley and Wiersema (2002), p. 708 and 721; Shimizu and Hitt
(2005), p. 55.
140Cf. Staw (1981), p. 579.
141Cf. Kahneman (2011), p. 4.
142Cf. Rubin et al. (1980), p. 405; Duhaime and Schwenk (1985), p. 291.
143Cf. Rubin et al. (1980), p. 409.
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suppress thoughts about potential image and perception con-
sequences to prevent an intensive EOC effect. Thirdly, EOC
was also stronger in experimental conditions in which DMs
were more passive, i.e. commitment was continued auto-
matically as a default mode (as is typically the case for BUs,
which the firm generally tries to retain144), instead of hav-
ing to deliberately choose not to terminate commitment.145
Hence, DMs could be advised to embrace divestment as a
viable and possible option in order to decrease psycholog-
ical resistance to it. Fourthly, it has been shown that EOC
effects were weaker when DMs were presented with oppor-
tunity costs, which demonstrated that alternative courses of
action were superior to the currently executed one, because
that changed the framing of the decision to include the loss
incurred with persistence.146 Thus, DMs may be able to alle-
viate their EOC tendency by increasing the salience of alter-
natives and opportunity costs.
To summarize, EOC might impede timely and rational di-
vestment despite significantly negative performance because
of managerial attachment and commitment to organizational
units. There could be several ways to weaken EOC from a
firm perspective, such as implementing control systems that
take EOC antecedents into account or educating DMs.
3.3. Incentive to Conceal Investment Mistakes
The preceding two psychological factors of familiarity
with a business segment and EOC typically shape DMs’ per-
ceptions and reasoning unconsciously and do not depend on
the DM’s specific interests and motivations. However, in line
with agency theory, managers might intentionally pursue
their individual goals when deciding on divestments.147 An
agency dependency occurs when a principal (here: business
owners) hires an agent (here: managers) to act on his or her
behalf and delegates decision authority. Both sets of players
are expected to follow their self-interests.148
Typically, divestment is interpreted as failure: it is “es-
sentially an admission that an inappropriate project choice
was made initially, and hence adversely affects perceptions
of [managerial] ability”149. DMs might be reluctant to di-
vest BUs that fail to provide value to the firm because man-
agers’ and shareholders’ incentives may diverge.150 As a re-
sult, there may be too little divestment from the shareholders’
perspective.151 This is because exit from a business typically
does not remain without consequences for the responsible
executive: divestment may damage DMs’ self-esteem as they
could view themselves as having been unable to lead the busi-
ness (back) to success, external judgment of divestment as
144Cf. Bergh (1997), p. 721.
145Cf. Rubin et al. (1980), p. 409 et seq.
146Cf. Northcraft and Neale (1986), p. 354; Staw (1997), p. 193.
147Cf. Porter (1976), p. 26; Boot (1992), p. 1401; Cho and Cohen (1997),
p. 368.
148Cf. Mitnick (1975), p. 27-30.
149Boot (1992), p. 1402.
150Cf. Porter (1976), p. 26; Boot (1992), p. 1401; Cho and Cohen (1997),
p. 367.
151Cf. Boot (1992), p. 1402.
failure might hamper DMs’ future career prospects and mo-
bility due to reputation damage and potential lay-offs of em-
ployees may damage relationships to different valued stake-
holders152, just to name a few consequences.153 Therefore,
it could be rational from an individual manager’s perspective
to deter divestment to maximize personal utility.154
However, divestment results are only impacted, if exec-
utives can actually act according to their drive to hide per-
ceived investment mistakes. Corporate governance155 mech-
anisms are designed to induce agents to seek outcomes con-
gruent to shareholders’ interests rather than managerial self-
interest.156 Thus, corporate governance mechanisms, such as
the board of directors, concentrated ownership, external au-
diting, and stakeholder activism could potentially prevent the
decision impact of DMs’ self-interests.157 Agency problems
concerning divestments and their possible resolution have
not yet been extensively researched.158 Nevertheless, schol-
ars have made several propositions, of which I will briefly
name four.
Boot (1992) pointed out that credible firm takeover
threats can prompt managers to behave more efficiently
from a firm perspective and decide contrarily to their self-
interests.159 Denis et al. (1997)study demonstrates that
divestment is more probable following corporate control
mechanisms of attempted corporate takeovers, board dis-
missals, and shareholder activism, which discipline man-
agers.160 Cho and Cohen (1997) suggested that managers
will deter divestment as long as they are able to blur nega-
tive BU performance with satisfactory performance of other
units.161
Investors may not be aware that an unprofitable BU is
not divested due to information asymmetries, as they might
have access only to firm level performance.162 Thus, the au-
thors argue that DMs will only divest units when hiding poor
BU performance is no longer feasible because the firm ex-
periences significant underperformance relative to industry
norms.163 Finally, Ravenscraft and Scherer (1991) have in-
dicated that senior management turnover can serve to admit
to previous investment mistakes through divestment without
152A stakeholder can be defined as “any group or individual who can affect
or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives." (Free-
man (1984): 46) Stakeholders could be e.g. employees, governments, cus-
tomers, suppliers, media, and communities (Cf. Freeman (2010): 25)
153Cf. Porter (1976), p. 25-26; Boot (1992), p. 1401.
154Cf. Mitnick (1975), p. 29; Boot (1992), p. 1401; Cho and Cohen
(1997), p. 368.
155Corporate governance is composed of “the whole set of legal, cultural,
and institutional arrangements that determine what publicly traded corpo-
rations can do, who controls them, how that control is exercised, and how
the risks and returns from the activities they undertake are allocated” (Blair
(1996): 3).
156Cf. Shleifer and Vishny (1997), p. 738; Daily et al. (2003), p. 372.
157Cf. Daily et al. (2003), p. 372; Aguilera et al. (2015), p. 37.
158Cf. Boot (1992), p. 1418.
159Cf. Ibid., p. 1418.
160Cf. Denis and Kruse (2000), p. 394.
161Cf. Cho and Cohen (1997), p. 367.
162Cf. Cho and Cohen (1997), p. 368.
163Cf. Ibid., p. 371.
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the same degree of fear of negative personal consequences
preceding managers would have had.164 Consequently, the
motivation to hide investment mistakes may impede divest-
ment because of managerial incentives and apprehension re-
garding possible negative personal consequences, if not pre-
vented by corporate governance mechanisms.
All three psychological factors described in section three
can each be expected to decrease divestment probability as
opposed to the DO factors of section two which increase di-
vestment likelihood. Nevertheless, it should be noted that
e.g. managerial attachment expectedly is not an impenetra-
ble barrier to divestment as factors such as poor unit or firm
performance may override it and pressure divestment.165
4. Organizational Factors
In this section, I will move further outward in the point of
focus from the DO and DM in question considered above, to
the level of the firm. Executives make divestment decisions
that are embedded in the organizational context of the firms
they serve.166 Whereas the factors in the preceding sections
can be more broadly generalized in their effects across firms,
the organizational dimension itself may help explain divest-
ment decisions. Thus, certain company characteristics may
increase or decrease divestment likelihood of (specific) BUs.
The aspects that will be discussed here are: negative per-
formance on the firm level, organizational identity and path
dependence and preceding divestments.
4.1. Negative Firm Performance
Duhaime and Grant (1984) found that in their sample,
approximately three quarters of divestment decisions were
made from a position in which the firm experienced infe-
rior performance compared to industry norms.167 Several re-
searchers have shown consistently that negative performance
of the parent firm significantly increases general BU divest-
ment likelihood.168 In this regard, performance has been
measured using different indicators for profitability, liquidity
or leverage169 such as (near) bankruptcy, extended periods
of financial loss, (industry adjusted) operating cash flow re-
turns, debt to equity ratio170, dividends paid as a percentage
of earnings, return on equity171, return on assets, current ra-
164Cf. Ravenscraft and Scherer (1991), p. 431 and 436.
165Cf. Duhaime and Grant (1984), p. 314.
166Cf. Wan et al. (2015), p. 206.
167Cf. Duhaime and Grant (1984), p. 310.
168Cf. Duhaime and Grant (1984), p. 310; Montgomery et al. (1984),
p. 834; Jain (1985), p. 222; Montgomery and Thomas (1988), p. 95;
Ravenscraft and Scherer (1991), p. 434; Hamilton and Chow (1993), p.
483; Chang (1996), p. 606; Cho and Cohen (1997), p. 370, Denis and Kruse
(2000), p. 413; Zuckerman (2000), p. 613; Shimizu (2007), p. 1503.
169Cf. Montgomery and Thomas (1988), p. 94.
170Debt to equity is a measure of financial leverage and is directly con-
nected to organizational risk. It is computed as: debt to equity = long-term
debt equity. (cf. Bettis and Mahajan (1985): 790-791)
171Return on equity quantifies profitability of shareholders’ investments by
using e.g. the following formula: ROE = profit to shareholders total share-
holders’ funds. (cf. Pew Tan et al. (2007): 81)
tio172, interest coverage173, debt to assets ratio, excess return
on the stock market and industry-adjusted ratio of earnings
before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization to total
assets.174
An interesting question is at what level and on which
performance scale divestment starts to become more likely
due to negative firm results. Whereas Montgomery et al.
(1984) find increased divestment probability for firms with
severe liquidity problems, such as near bankruptcy, Cho and
Cohen (1997) find that firms had experienced four years
of declining but still positive returns prior to divestment.175
This may indicate that firms need not be confronted with
an existential financial threat to divest organizational units
on a broader scale. However, the latter study also found
that while these firms might be unlikely to face a significant
threat of bankruptcy, divesting firms still exhibited below in-
dustry returns in the year of divestment.176 Duhaime and
Grant (1984) argued that negative performance relative to
the firm’s own past or to current industry competitors can
lead to higher divestment likelihood (although in their study
return on equity relative to industry norms had the only sta-
tistically significant effect on divestment).177 Nevertheless,
it appears that relative firm performance, at least relative to
industry competitors, has an important impact on divestment
decisions, in addition to the effect of more severe monetary
difficulties, such as extended periods of financial losses.178
There are several reasons why poor firm performance
could lead to increased divestment: shareholders and firm
creditors may pressure divestment in the face of firm financial
distress179, the firm might be interested in using divestment
to improve its financial standing180 (e.g. through a sell-off or
hoped-for positive stock market reactions) as it may be diffi-
cult to gain access to external capital in the firm’s position181
and the firm may experience shortage of capital182, or corpo-
rate DMs might interpret poor firm performance as a trigger
to reevaluate corporate strategy183.
Therefore, poor financial performance at the firm level
commonly causes increased divestment probability. How-
ever, as a cautionary note, firms might also decide to post-
pone divestments to a position of higher financial strength in
order to be less vulnerable to possible stock market reactions
172The current ratio can be calculated as: current ratio = pretax assets
current liabilities. (Cf. Montgomery & Thomas, 1988: 94)
173The formula used for interest coverage is: interest coverage = (pretax
income + interest expense) interest expense. (Cf. Montgomery & Thomas,
1988: 94)
174Cf. e.g. Duhaime and Grant (1984), p. 305; Montgomery et al. (1984),
p. 834; Jain (1985), p. 214; Montgomery and Thomas (1988), p. 94; Cho
and Cohen (1997), p. 370, 371; Denis and Kruse (2000), p. 398.
175Cf. Montgomery et al. (1984), p. 834; Cho and Cohen (1997), p. 370.
176Cf. Cho and Cohen (1997), p. 370 and 371.
177Cf. Duhaime and Grant (1984), p. 305 and 310.
178Cf. Duhaime and Grant (1984), p. 313; Montgomery et al. (1984), p.
834; Montgomery and Thomas (1988), p. 94.
179Cf. Duhaime and Grant (1984), p. 305.
180Cf. Montgomery and Thomas (1988), p. 95.
181Cf. Sicherman and Pettway (1987), p. 1262.
182Cf. Hamilton and Chow (1993), p. 483.
183Cf. Montgomery and Thomas (1988), p. 95.
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and a potential financial loss following the divestment.184
Thus, exceptions to the generally observed relationship can-
not be ruled out, as firms may interpret their financial stand-
ings and assess the opportunities and threats of divestment
differently.
4.2. Organizational Identity and Image
The topic of international divestment, i.e. the reduc-
tion of a firm’s international operations, has not yet been
the focus of ample research.185 Wan et al. (2015) offer
the bounded rationality186 perspective that international di-
vestment decisions could be impacted by an organization’s
identity and image.187 Whereas organizational image188
denotes the attributes a firm’s members perceive external
constituents to ascribe to the firm, organizational identity
means the firm members’ collective internal understanding
of key distinguishing merits of their firm.189 Organizations
are motivated to create a favorable external evaluation as
they seek external approval and status and hope for wide-
ranging positive reputation effects.190 Firm identity gives
organizational members an interpretation frame for occur-
rences and shapes their actions and emotions, creating a
sense of belonging and deeper commitment to the organiza-
tion.191 Thus, organizational image and identity are of key
importance to a firm.
For multinational companies, image and identity are
probable to rest on international success.192 A firm hence
may generally hesitate to divest internationally and select
very specific international DOs because of its likely con-
cern that divestment could damage how the firm believes
external stakeholders and the members themselves inter-
nally view the firm and its internationality.193 The degree
to which firms are guided by their images and identities in
deciding if, when, and which international divestment to
pursue may vary according to the firm’s international con-
text (internationalization experience, pace of international
184Cf. Duhaime and Grant (1984), p. 314.
185Cf. Wan et al. (2015), p. 205.
186Rationality describes a form of reasoned and often gain maximizing be-
havior that is appropriate for achieving specific goals within the given frame-
work of conditions and constraints. Bounded rationality denotes the restric-
tion on optimal reasoning imposed by limited information-processing capac-
ity of the DM, which leads to suboptimal results in certain situations. (Cf.
Simon (1972): 161 and 162; Mumby and Putnam (1992): 469)
187Cf. Wan et al. (2015), p. 206.
188Organizational image and reputation are two distinct concepts, as im-
age is the view organizational members believe others to have of their orga-
nization and reputation characterizes the actual external assessment of the
organization. (Cf. Weigelt and Camerer (1988): 443; Fombrun and Shanley
(1990): 234; Dutton and Dukerich (1991)1: 547)
189Cf. Dutton and Dukerich (1991), p. 547; Gioia and Thomas (1996), p.
372; Hatch and Schultz (1997), p. 357 and 358.
190Cf. Roberts and Dowling (2002), p. 1077; Highhouse et al. (2009), p.
1483; Wan et al. (2015), p. 212.
191Cf. Dutton and Dukerich (1991), p. 549; Wan et al. (2015), p. 206 and
215.
192Cf. Wan et al. (2015), p. 211.
193Cf. Ibid., p. 206.
growth, directions of internalization, importance of a specific
unit to the firm’s image or identity etc.).194
Wan et al. (2015) propose eight general facets relating to
organizational image and identity that shape a firm’s overall
propensity to divest internationally and the selection of a spe-
cific international DO.195 Two image related aspects that are
expected to deter international divestment are: if a firm is
newly internationalized (mainly as the firm will tend to pro-
tect and avoid conflict with its new image for which it likely
had to overcome adversities)196 and or if the firm originates
from an emerging market (primarily because the firm then
may have had to overcome unfavorable country-of-origin ef-
fects and may be a symbol for success in its home country)197.
International exit can also be inhibited by two identity re-
lated factors: more experience in internationalization (as the
firm then expectedly has integrated its internationality into
its core identity and members typically seek to maintain cog-
nitive and emotional coherence with this identity)198 and or
consistent growth in international expansion (a similar logic
applies to firms that experience success in international ex-
pansion, but are less experienced yet)199. In addition, the
authors predict that two characteristics linked to image will
make a business entity a less likely DO: if the foreign oper-
ation generates more positive publicity (because in this case
the unit is considered more valuable in establishing a posi-
tive firm image)200 and or if the operation is located in a
highly developed country (since it then likely offers a more
favorable consumer perception and overall stakeholder im-
pression)201. Units are also less probable to be divested if
the following two aspects concerning image are the case: if
TMT members have been employed at the foreign entity (as
a result of personal loyalty, cf. 3.1, p. 11)202 and or if the en-
tity was established early in the company’s history (because
the firm then supposedly identifies itself more with this en-
tity)203.
Consequently, organizational image and identity may
have a significant influence on general divestment propen-
sity and DO choices.
4.3. Path Dependence and Preceding Divestments
Apart from a firm’s current contingencies, its past could
also influence divestment decisions. Firm decision-making
frequently follows past organizational actions.204 It has been
194Cf. Ibid., p. 211.
195Cf. Ibid., p. 213.
196Cf. Ibid., p. 212-13.
197Cf. Häubl (1996), p. 90; Verlegh and Steenkamp (1999), p. 528; Batra
et al. (2000), p. 83; Olins (2002), p. 246; Wan et al. (2015), p. 214.
198Cf. Festinger (1957), p.1; Benito and Welch (1997), p. 17; Wan et al.
(2015), p. 216.
199Cf. Santos and Eisenhardt (2005), p. 500; Wan et al. (2015), p. 216.
200Cf. Wan et al. (2015), p. 214.
201Cf. Roth and Romeo (1992), p. 477; Wan et al. (2015), p. 215.
202Cf. Wan et al. (2015), p. 217.
203Cf. Chang and Singh (1999), p. 1032; Wan et al. (2015), p. 217.
204Cf. Cyert and March (1963), p. 27 et seq.; Boeker (1989), p. 509; Teece
et al. (2000), p. 16.
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pointed out that firm actions over time are necessarily path-
dependent, since a firm’s present choices are constrained by
its history and hitherto accumulated knowledge base, creat-
ing a self-reinforcing pattern.205 In this regard, the concept
of a dominant logic denotes that firms, at least within phases
of equilibrium, make decisions within one accepted frame
of reference and belief structure which is based, not least,
on past experience.206 When an organization implements a
particular course of action repeatedly, the action can become
more legitimized and institutionalized within the organiza-
tion.207 Especially when faced with financial difficulties or
other threats, firms may turn to well-established solutions
that have been used before.208 Thus, in companies that have
divested business entities before, it is more likely that divest-
ment will be viewed as an appropriate solution to problems,
such as poor unit performance.209 Additionally, from an or-
ganizational learning perspective, competence with different
organizational forms, such as acquisitions or alliances, can
be built up in the course of repeated and applicable expe-
rience.210 Firms may learn through prior divestments and
become more effective at managing business exits, and thus
may be able to create more value through divesting than a
firm without prior experience ceteris paribus could.211
Hence, firms experienced in handling divestments may
be more inclined to divest because divestment is more read-
ily accepted and accessible as a solution and because the firm
has the potential to create superior value in drawing from its
previous experience and knowledge in this field. Indeed, pre-
vious divestments have been shown to significantly increase
general divestment probability.212 However, business entity
divestments have yet to be the focus of more attention in path
dependence research, as current evidence is rather scant.213
To summarize this section, a firm’s current situation and
past, here namely a firm’s current negative performance, or-
ganizational identity and image and preceding divestments,
can have a considerable influence on divestment decisions.
Whereas financial difficulties on the corporate level and di-
vestment experience supposedly may increase divestment
probability across organizational units, organizational iden-
205Cf. David (1985), p. 332; Arthur (1994), p. 1; Teece et al. (2000),
p. 16; Chang (1996), p. 591; Teece et al. (1997), p. 522; Margolis and
Liebowitz (1995), p. 206; EEriksson et al. (2000), p. 307; Shimizu (2007),
p. 1501; Sydow et al. (2009), p. 704; Feldman (2014), p. 816; Greve and
Seidel (2015), p. 475.
206Cf. Prahalad and Bettis (1986), p. 490 and 492; Bettis and Prahalad
(1995), p. 7 and 13.
207Cf. Ocasio (1995), p. 317 et seq.; Crossan et al. (1999), p. 525; Shimizu
(2007), 1501.
208Cf. Meschi and Métais (2015), p. 409.
209Cf. Shimizu (2007), p. 1501.
210Cf. Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999), p. 51; Kale and Singh (1999), p.
1; Anand and Khanna (2000), p. 313; Hayward (2002), p. 21; Kale et al.
(2002), p. 762; Haleblian et al. (2006), p. 366; Rothaermel and Deeds
(2006), p. 429.
211Cf. Villalonga and McGahan (2005), p. 1186.
212Cf. Villalonga and McGahan (2005), p. 1199; Shimizu (2007), p. 1505;
Alscher and Brauer (2015), p. 300; Meschi and Métais (2015), p. 413 and
417.
213Cf. Alscher and Brauer (2015), p. 288.
tity and image may serve to make firms inclined to not divest
specific units which are deemed to be of key importance to
identity or image.
5. External Factors
Organizational DMs may not solely be influenced by DO,
individual psychological and organizational factors. Rather,
the supra-organizational level of external entities could also
exhibit significant influence on important strategic issues,
such as divestment, as taking stakeholder interests into ac-
count is argued to be critical for firm success.214 In fact, a cor-
poration itself has been defined as “a system of stakeholder
groups, a complex set of relationships between and among in-
terest groups with different rights, objectives, expectations,
and responsibilities”215. In this section, three stakeholders
who may sway divestment decisions are briefly examined:
the media, political entities and blockholders.
5.1. Media Influence in Stigmatized Industries
The media’s impact on firms derives predominantly from
their capacity to focus public attention on the topics they
choose to cover.216 Media coverage considerably shapes pub-
lic opinion mainly through two mechanisms: exposure to
certain subjects and positive or negative framing of infor-
mation.217 As a consequence, unfavorable media reports on
firms and their executives can considerably damage e.g. per-
ceived firm legitimacy218, stock market performance, CEO
compensation and retention, and business relationships.219
In this regard, research shows that firms are likely to respond
to media attacks by using impression management (IM) tac-
tics.
IM tactics include refuting facts, accepting responsibil-
ity, issuing campaigns highlighting positive firm merits and
reframing the situation more positively to prevent possible
negative consequences.220 As Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) put
it, “managers prefer to offer symbolic assurances rather than
substantive action since the former usually preserves flexibil-
ity and resources.”221 However, these symbolic or rhetorical
means are argued to be ineffective for firms operating in stig-
matized industries in which there is social contestation, audi-
ence hostility and scrutiny (e.g. by advocacy groups and non-
governmental organizations) toward firms and a pronounced
214Cf. Clarkson (1995), p. 107; Harrison and Freeman (1999), p. 479;
Freeman (2010), p. 24.
215Clarkson (1995), p. 107.
216Cf. Deephouse (2000), p. 1095; Rindova et al. (2005), p. 1037.
217Cf. Pollock and Rindova (2003), p. 631.
218Legitimacy can be defined as “not only the normative justification of
organizations but also the cognitive validation of an entity as desirable,
proper, and appropriate in a widely shared system of beliefs and norms”.
(Rao (1994): 31)
219E.g. cf. Zuckerman (1999), p. 1428-1429; Pollock and Rindova (2003),
p. 631; Wu (2004), p. 219; Core et al. (2008), p. 23; Bednar (2012), p.
133, 143; Chen et al. (2013), p. 436-439; Durand and Vergne (2015), p.
1207; Ferguson et al. (2015), p. 3; Nguyen (2015), p. 3.
220Cf. Elsbach and Kramer (1996), p. 442; Bansal and Clelland (2004), p.
95; Durand and Vergne (2015), p. 1207.
221Ashforth and Gibbs (1990), p. 182.
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distance between industry outsiders and insiders.222 Stigma
concerns the very core of a firm’s activities and is of rela-
tive permanence.223 One example is the arms industry, being
typically associated with questionable behaviors and values,
such as to be intensifying tragic effects of war.224 Organiza-
tions that have BUs operating in such stigmatized industries
typically utilize concealment tactics and seek to evade me-
dia coverage of any tenor in order to not be associated with
the denounced industry and minimize negative spillover ef-
fects to other businesses and network partners.225 As a result,
when a firm operating in a stigmatized industry is the subject
of media attacks, ceteris paribus, it is more likely to divest
some assets or whole BUs from that industry to distance it-
self from it and visibly demonstrate its willingness to take
action and go beyond symbolism.226 This is because routine
IM tactics are unlikely to alleviate highly unfavorable cov-
erage and only attract increased unwanted scrutiny and dis-
creditation.227 Divestment likelihood is also increased, but to
a lesser extent, if other industry members are attacked (the
more similar the target and the specific firm, the more pro-
nounced the threat and ergo the effect).228 Additionally, the
effects of unfavorable media coverage of the focal firm and
its peers are additive, i.e. each additional media attack in-
creases divestment likelihood further.229
Therefore, organizations in stigmatized business fields
are more likely to divest parts of or whole BUs from these
negatively perceived industries when being attacked by the
media.
5.2. Political Pressure
It can be seen as politics’ rightful role to regulate com-
panies and enforce e.g. anti-trust laws in public interest.230
Political entities that can exercise political influence on or-
ganizations include local, national and foreign governments,
agencies such as the World Bank, courts, citizen initiatives
and legislators.231 These entities could for instance limit the
amount of credit available, implement legal changes (e.g.
tax and depreciation, regulations etc.) or offer subsidies.232
Thus, firms might be forced or motivated to change their
strategy and divest organizational units because of political
pressures.233 Anecdotal evidence, such as the German nu-
clear phase-out mentioned in the introduction, suggests that
companies might have to adapt to changed environmental
222Cf. Ashforth and Gibbs (1990), p. 183; Hudson (2008), p. 259; Devers
et al. (2009), p. 157; Durand and Vergne (2015), p. 1205, 1207, 1218.
223Cf. Durand and Vergne (2015), p. 1208.
224Cf. Ibid., p. 1210.
225Cf. Devers et al. (2009), p. 165; Hudson and Okhuysen (2009), p. 134,
142; Durand and Vergne (2015), p. 1205.
226Cf. Durand and Vergne (2015), p. 1218.
227Cf. Ibid., p. 1208.
228Cf. Ibid., p. 1214.
229Cf. Ibid., p. 1214.
230Cf. Freeman (2010), p. 13.
231Cf. Ibid., p. 15.
232Cf. Hillman and Keim (1995), p. 196; Freeman (2010), p. 16 et seq.
233Cf. Murtha and Lenway (1994), p. 113; Cho and Cohen (1997), p. 373.
conditions imposed by political entities and accordingly di-
vest businesses rendered unattractive. Firms may also divest
proactively in the anticipation that divestment might other-
wise be forced in the future.234
In addition to that, executives may decide to divest oper-
ations because of personal costs of continuing a certain busi-
ness built up by constant political pressure.235 One example
could be the widespread pressure to exit South African busi-
ness US firms experienced in the 1980s as a result of severe
moral concerns pertaining to the treatment of black South
Africans by the minority white South African government.236
Personal costs of not divesting under these circumstances ac-
cruing to executives could be e.g. a deteriorating public im-
age, being perceived as morally insensitive to questionable
apartheid practices, and political denunciation.237 Divest-
ment decisions as a result of personal utility maximization
are consistent with Jensen and Murphy (1990) conclusion
that TMT personal incentives may be decoupled from firm
performance, despite variable remuneration components.238
Wright and Ferris (1997) interpreted significantly negative
stock market reactions to US withdrawal from business in
South Africa as evidence for the underlying agency problem
outlined here.239 They argued that many divested BUs likely
were profitable and represented an efficient utilization of cor-
porate endowments.240 Political pressure may hence lead
to divestments that are in conflict with value-enhancement
goals, i.e. that are costly to shareholders, because executives
act in their self-interests.241
Therefore, divestment decisions could be influenced by
political power because of an organizational need to adhere
to legal and other circumstances and as a result of managerial
selfinterests. However, noneconomic forces, such as political
pressure, remain hard to document and measure, as they op-
erate in ways that are difficult to observe.242
5.3. Blockholder Ownership Impact
It is argued that because publicly traded firms are depen-
dent on a high firm valuation, control exercised by investors
powerfully constrains organizational strategy.243 Generally,
stockowners’ primary goal is maximizing the return on their
investment.244 Blockholders own at least five percent of a
company’s shares and expectedly are more capable and in-
centivized to monitor and control managerial activities than
are smaller shareholders.245 This is because they have a lot
at stake financially, higher voting power, and can credibly
234Cf. Wright and Ferris (1997), p. 80.
235Cf. Ibid., p. 79.
236Cf. Ennis and Parkhill (1986), p. 32.
237Cf. Wright and Ferris (1997), p. 79.
238Cf. Jensen and Murphy (1990), p. 262.
239Cf. Wright and Ferris (1997), p. 81.
240Cf. Ibid., p. 79.
241Cf. Ibid., p. 77.
242Cf. Wright and Ferris (1997), p. 79.
243Cf. Zuckerman (2000), p. 615.
244Cf. Ibid., p. 613.
245Cf. Demsetz (1983), p. 387; Bethel and Liebeskind (1993), p. 16.
A. Kieliszek / Junior Management Science 2(3) (2017) 104-123 117
threaten to sell their shares and facilitate a takeover, should
corporate executives not make the desired policy changes.246
Hence, when blockholders perceive managerial actions to be
inconsistent with their interests, they will often try to influ-
ence outcomes in their favor to what they deem appropri-
ate.247 Research has confirmed that powerful blockholders
may markedly influence BU divestment decisions.248 There
are different underlying reasons why blockholders should de-
mand divestment in their interest, two of which will be briefly
discussed in the following.
Firstly, blockholders may seek to correct strategic mis-
takes of value-destroying over-diversification of the past.249
Scholars have e.g. argued that managers overly expanded
size and scope of their firms before the 1970s without creat-
ing sufficient value, as they were lead to diversify by personal
wealth and bankruptcy risk concerns, coupled with exagger-
ated self-confidence in their abilities.250 It has been demon-
strated that blockholder ownership significantly increases di-
vestment probability in this situation, i.e. that they effec-
tively bring about divestment to fix past organizational in-
vestment errors.251
Secondly, blockholders may successfully demand divest-
ments in order to make the firm’s stocks more easily un-
derstood by analysts and thus increase stock valuations.252
Zuckerman (2000) has shown that stocks of firms which are
diversified across several industries are traded at an ‘illegiti-
macy discount’.
This discount is at least partly due to the fact that ana-
lysts specialize by industry and stocks are evaluated within
the context of industry categories.253 Per definition, diver-
sified firms operate across multiple industries and defy this
categorization, which impedes risk and return comparison to
other stocks under a common frame of reference and hence
leads to reduced coverage and endorsement by analysts.254
Since analysts’ recommendations and profit forecasts sig-
nificantly influence demand, shareholders have successfully
pressured de- diversification to mitigate these disadvantages
and increase stock valuations.255 Consequently, important
shareholders can influence divestment decisions in their fa-
vor when they perceive that the organization fails to pursue
value-maximization.
246Cf. Demsetz (1983), p. 387; Shleifer and Vishny (1990), p. 746 et seq.;
Bethel and Liebeskind (1993), p. 18.
247Cf. Zuckerman (2000), p. 592.
248Cf. Bethel and Liebeskind (1993), p. 27; Denis et al. (1997), p. 135;
Zuckerman (2000), p. 591; Sanders (2001), p. 484; Villalonga & McGahan
(2005), p. 1197.
249Cf. Bethel and Liebeskind (1993), p. 15; Denis et al. (1997), p. 135.
250Cf. Amihud and Lev (1981), p. 605; Roll (1986), p. 212; Jensen and
Murphy (1990), p. 262; Bethel and Liebeskind (1993), p. 15; Cf. Lang and
Stulz (1994), p. 1248; Berger and Ofek (1995), p. 39; Zuckerman (2000),
p. 592.;
251Cf. Bethel and Liebeskind (1993), p. 27; Denis et al. (1997), p. 158;
Sanders (2001), p. 484.
252Cf. Zuckerman (2000), p. 591.
253Cf. Zuckerman (1999), p. 1398; Zuckerman (2000), p. 593.
254Cf. Zuckerman (2000), p. 596, 611.
255Cf. Stickel (1992), p. 1811; Womack (1996), p. 137; Zuckerman
(2000), p. 591; Brown et al. (2013), p. 1.
Therefore, the media, political entities and blockholders
can considerably shape divestment decisions under specific
circumstances. Each of these stakeholders can be expected to
have different motivations and hence try to influence divest-
ment decisions in different situations. Whereas shareholders
arguably primarily care about firm value, the media and po-
litical entities may act more in public interest.
6. Conclusion and Outlook
Divestments typically are of major strategic importance
and can potentially lead to substantial firm performance im-
provements.256 Thus, it is crucial for DMs to make sound
divestment decisions to increase the likelihood that divest-
ments are appropriate and successful.257 However, a 2002
study found that more than 75% of divestments were not only
done under strained circumstances, but also after long time
delays, when problems had become so pressing that action
became inevitable.258 In this final section, I will summarize
the scope and results of this thesis and briefly draw several
conclusions for business practice and future research.
The goal of this thesis is to provide a systematic overview
of several determinants of divestment decisions in order to
better understand the entirety of significant influencing fac-
tors. A visual overview of the influencing factors discussed in
this thesis can be found in the appendix 5. Executives gen-
erally seek to retain businesses. Nevertheless, should DMs
come to the conclusion that a certain unit fails to provide
sufficient value to the company, they may contemplate di-
vestment.
I have thus started with the DO itself as the narrowest
point of focus and demonstrated that negative BU perfor-
mance, insufficient benefits from the interplay between BUs,
whether between related or unrelated entities, and BU infe-
riority to marketplace alternatives, whether concerning costs
or market opportunities, each considerably increases unit di-
vestment likelihood. Because subjective individual psycho-
logical factors also have an impact, observed decisions may
diverge from decisions that would be made, were only objec-
tive DO factors considered. Familiarity with the DO’s busi-
ness segment may distort a DM’s DO assessment, escalation
of commitment may lead to retaining failing projects despite
being aware of their poor performance and the managerial
incentive to conceal investment mistakes may at least post-
pone divestment as a result of self-interests. These forces
may deter (timely) divestment. On a broader point of fo-
cus, the organizational context was shown to have an impact
on divestment decisions, pressuring or inhibiting exit from
certain BUs and influencing general divestment risk across
BUs. Negative firm performance and path dependence and
preceding divestments increase general propensity to divest,
whereas units that are perceived to be essential to organiza-
tional image and identity are more reluctantly exited. The
256Cf. Montgomery et al. (1984), p. 831.
257Cf. Porter (1976), p. 21; Duhaime and Grant (1984), p. 301.
258Cf. Dranikoff et al. (2002), p. 76.
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dimension of external stakeholders, the media, political enti-
ties, and blockholders, may also pressure DMs considerably
and sway divestment decisions.
Further research subjects which would have been rele-
vant but were beyond the scope of this thesis are e.g. whether
it may be rational to delay divestment decisions as current BU
value may not be a very good performance predictor (real
options theory)259, organizational threat rigidity and inertia,
resistance from numerous entities within the organization,
divestment as part of overall corporate portfolio strategy, di-
vestment patterns over time and DMs’ overconfidence and
additional cognitive biases.
There are several implications for business practice that
can be inferred from divestment research. Recognition of
divestment influences can help put BUs to a viable position
within the film and render divestment unnecessary or initiate
timely divestment when needed.260 For the scope of this the-
sis, I will limit the discussion to five suggestions. Firstly, DMs
themselves should generally be aware of what forces may un-
consciously drive their divestment decisions (e.g. EOC or fa-
miliarity) apart from the factors that are analytically assessed
(e.g. BU performance) in order to better be able to mitigate
cognitive biases.261 Executives could e.g. actively seek per-
spectives from outside their social circles and organizations
to lessen perception-distorting effects of attachment and fa-
miliarity to certain entities.262
Secondly, performance evaluation and control systems
and other organizational factors (e.g. culture) should en-
courage DMs to take a proactive and future-oriented view
and facilitate overcoming the current failure connotation
of divestments and prevent delayed decisions in order to
support unbiased decision-making.263 Generally, scholars
have urged to accept divestment as an appropriate and
often necessary strategic decision.264 Thirdly, managerial
self-interests and biases concerning divestment should nev-
ertheless be monitored by corporate governance systems in
order to prevent egoistic decisions. Fourthly, organizations
as a whole should acknowledge their tendency to implement
well-established solutions, especially when confronted with
a problem or threat, and actively consider new solutions in
order to reach optimal results.265 New approaches could
e.g. be tested on small experimental scales to gain a broader
repertoire of possible tactics and e.g. TMT turnover and
outside members, as well as collaborating with universities,
forming alliances with other firms, etc. could be means to
develop these new solutions. Fifthly, the results underscore
the need to cooperate with stakeholders and anticipate and
include their interests in firm management and leadership.266
259Cf. Damarju, Barney & Makhija (2015), p. 729.
260Cf. Duhaime and Grant (1984), p. 314.
261Cf. Staw (1981), p. 585; Shimizu (2007), p. 1511.
262Cf. Staw (1981), p. 585; Shimizu (2007), p. 1511.
263Cf. Staw (1981), p. 585; Duhaime and Grant (1984), p. 314.
264Cf. Porter (1976), p. 21; Montgomery et al. (1984), p. 838.
265Cf. Shimizu (2007), p. 1511.
266Cf. Bethel and Liebeskind (1993), p. 30.
A general direction for future research could be towards a
more integrated and contingency-based multi-motive model
of corporate divestment decision-making. This would help
understand the interplay of different factors, their specific
decision weights and under which circumstances each factor
is influencing divestment to what degree. Thereby, divest-
ment decisions would be more easily predictable and DMs
could be better supported.
Additionally, divestment literature could be augmented
by further research to address the current shortcomings of
measurement challenges, limited access to detailed informa-
tion on divestment decision-making processes and relatively
one-sided geographic sample coverage. Further field and lab-
oratory experiments and interviews should be conducted to
overcome measurement difficulties of the decision impact
of e.g. individual psychological and organizational forces
and the challenge of gaining access to such sensitive strate-
gic decision-making processes as divestment.267 Conduct-
ing interviews and distributing questionnaires within com-
panies could complement research in this regard, although,
however, this could potentially bring a range of other prob-
lems, such as limited sample size, nonresponse bias, possibly
skewed results and interview effects, which should be paid
attention to.268
Apart from that, factors that have been demonstrated to
significantly affect divestment until now could be tested for
robustness across different geographies and on a longitudi-
nal time frame, as there currently is a strong US focus in di-
vestment research. This is because firm data availability typi-
cally constrains sample construction to large publicly held US
firms.269 Furthermore, country culture itself could provide
another dimension that affects divestment decisions. A coun-
try culture could e.g. facilitate or impede admitting failure
or could foster or obstruct a tendency to keep trying to turn
around a struggling BU. Numerous other particular divest-
ment research questions, such as the influence of DMs’ char-
acter and past experiences or industry-related dimensions,
that could be interesting to address in the future are listed in
the appendix 6.
In conclusion, there still remains much opportunity to
learn about the phenomenon of divestments and the under-
lying interplay of economic and noneconomic factors, to ex-
tend our understanding of divestment from research con-
ducted so far.
267Cf. Duhaime and Grant (1984), p. 294.
268Cf. Hamilton and Chow (1993), p. 480.
269Cf. Shimizu (2007), p. 1511; Damarju, Barney & Makhija (2015), p.
742.
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